Saturday, October 2, 2010

The Upside of an Iranian Bomb

Not a week goes by without a major U.S. newspaper or news network running a story on the threat a nuclear Iran would pose to the United States.  While there is reason to fear an Iranian bomb, no stories are ever run on the potential upsides of a nuclear Iran for U.S. foreign policy.  This is either because 1) people are so close minded they can't see the issue in another light or 2) they are afraid of being labeled as appeasers of a Hitler-esque regime.  I would very much like to see Iran kept from obtaining nuclear weapons, and I am absolutely opposed to appeasing Tehran, but here is my view on the potential upsides of an Iranian bomb for U.S. foreign policy.

The first thing to realize is that the entire Middle East, with a slight exception in Iraq, distrusts and fears Iran.  This is because of: 1) the Persian/Arab divide 2) the fact that Iran is Shia dominated while the majority of the Middle East is Sunni, and 3) the view that Iran is a regional destabilizer due to its support for Hezbollah and other regional terrorist organizations.  Tehran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon has only intensified the region's fear and has pushed many countries to seek extra security measures.

The second thing to realize is that ever since the end of World War II, and more importantly the declaration of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, the United States has been the primary security provider in the Middle East.  It has used military force numerous times to ensure regional stability and preserve the flow of oil.  Most Arab regimes have embraced this trade off: in return for the security and stability provided by the U.S. military, they buy U.S. defense goods, price oil in dollars, and recently, have supported the War on Terror.

The third thing to realize is that China now buys more oil from Saudi Arabia than the United States.  This is a significant change because it threatens to upset the agreement outlined above.  With China supplanting the U.S. as the region's biggest customer, its influence in the halls of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, and Doha is likely to rise.  In the future, this could threaten the pricing of oil in dollars, the regional purchases of U.S. defense goods, the region's support for U.S. initiatives, and most importantly, the region's tolerance of a strong U.S. military presence.  This growing threat must be countered.  The world will continue to run on oil for the foreseeable future, and even if the U.S. weans itself off imported oil, it must remain the dominant power in the Middle East so as to exercise influence over the supply of a vital natural resource.  Simply put, being the dominant military and diplomatic power in the Middle East gives the United States immense leverage over other states.

Given these facts it is clear how the United States can use the fear invoked by Tehran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon to enhance its position in the region at the expense of China's.  With China's military still incapable of projecting power beyond its immediate sphere of influence, Middle Eastern leaders know that their only hope for additional security in the face of the Iranian threat is to move closer to the United States.  Washington has smartly been courting these needs and has recently agreed to numerous major arms deals with Middle Eastern States (including sealing with Saudi Arabia the largest arms deal in history).  Therefore, the threat of a nuclear Iran has allowed the United States to leverage its predominant position in the region by reminding local states that only Washington can guarantee their security.  This leverage will increase even more, and for the long term, if Tehran does in fact achieve nuclear capabilities, thus binding key Middle Eastern players to the United States for years to come.  If Washington is smart, it will then use this leverage to contain China's influence in the region.

In conclusion, the United States can use the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to increase its position in the Middle East through the provision of security guarantees and the sale of defense goods.  Washington can then use the dependency of Middle Eastern states on its security apparatus as leverage to keep China's military out of the Middle East, thereby remaining the dominant power in the region.

No comments:

Post a Comment